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The Founding Fathers and the Natural Law:
A Study of the Source of Our Legal Institutions
by Clarence Manion - Dean of the University of Notre Dame College of Law
0 Where did the Founding Fathers get the principles upon which they established
our government? What was the source of their faith? The bedrock of their convic-
tions? What was the political evolution of our Constitution? The legal philosophy
of our Bill of Rights? The discussion of these questions by Dean Manion is timely for
it is necessary now to make soundings and take bearings if the Ship of State is to
continue on its true course. Whereas the Revolution of 1688 brought the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty to England, the American colonists resisted that doctrine
and adhered to the true natural law doctrine of constitutionalism which had come
down from the Middle Ages through the writings of Bracton, Fortescue and Coke.
Dean Manion shows that the principles on which Otis, Jefferson, Adams, Hamilton,
Mason, Madison and Wilson relied are still the basic need of our day.
0 The term "natural law" has always
had a great variety of meanings.' In
one or more of its many senses it is
acknowledged by everybody. The
procession of daylight and darkness
through the four seasons of. every
year promulgates one kind of natural
law, while the instinct of self-pre-
servation in all living things tells of
another kind. The most violent op-
ponents of the natural law concept
entertain, nevertheless, a healthy
respect for the natural law of gravity
and admit that for all practical pur-
poses it is universal.
There is no serious controversy
about natural law until discussion
reaches the point where the natural
law becomes supernatural, the point,
in other words, where natural law is
described as the will of God per-
ceived by His rational creatures. At
this crucial point the fat of disagree-
ment is definitely in the fire of un-
quartered argument.
It must be admitted therefore, that
in one sense or another, all of the
Founding Fathers of the American
Republic believed in natural law.
Did this belief stop with the "laws of
nature" merely, or did it extend to
an acknowledgment that natural law
is a projection of the Eternal Law of
God Himself? What was the natural
law philosophy of the Founding
Fathers, and to what extent did they
write this philosophy into our Ameri-
can constitutional system?
Predominantly the Founding Fa-
thers were lawyers, trained in and
devoted to the common law. "So
steeped were the eighteenth century
colonial lawyers in Coke's teachings
... that the controversial literature
of the era of the [American] Revolu-
tion, if it is to be understood, must
be read or interpreted by a common
law lawyer. Indeed he must be a com-
mon law lawyer of the nineteenth
century type brought up to read and
reread Coke and Blackstone until he
got the whole feeling and atmosphere
of those who led resistance to the
home government".2 In the same arti-
cle Dean Pound reminds us that the
common law was "a tradition and
not a code". In other words Coke's
Institutes ana Reports consist of par-
ticulars processed reasonably from
basic generalities taken from medie-
val cases and customs. Familiar to
all American lawyers of the Revolu-
tionary period was Coke's report of
Calvin's Case which goes directly to
the point where the "natural law"
controversy is now most heated and
contentious:
The Law of nature was before any
judicial or municipal law [and] is
immutable. The law of nature is that
which God at the time of creation of
the nature of man infused into his
heart for his preservation and direc-
tion; and this is the eternal law, the
moral law, called also the law of na-
ture. And by this law, written with the
finger of God in the heart of man,
were the people of God a long time
governed before the law was written
by Moses, who was the first reporter
or writer of law in the world .... God
and nature is one to all and therefore
the law of God and nature is one to
all .... This law of nature which in-
deed is the eternal law of the Creator,
infused into the heart of the creature
at the time of his creation, was two
1. Charles Grove Haines, The Revival of Natural
Low Concepts (1930) Part I.
2. Roscoe Pound, "The Development of Consti-
tutional Guarantees of Liberty", 20 Notre Dame
Lawyer 183 11945).
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thousand years before any Jaws writ-
ten and before any judicial or mu-
nicipal laws. And certain it is that
before judicial or municipal laws were
made, kings did decide cases according
to natural equity and were not tied to
any rule or formality of law.8
This is a fair digest of the theistic
principle upon which all of our pre-
Revolutionary legal education was
based. The principle was even more
compactly summarized by Coke him-
self when he quoted Bracton to but-
tress his historic argument with
James I, "The King is under God
and the Law". Human government,
in other words, is limited by the law
of God. Coke properly regarded that
maxim as controlling in his day just
as Bracton had interpreted it to be
controlling in the Middle Ages. This
principle was the mainspring of what
Coke welded into the common law
of England. A learned and talented
English lawyer has recently traced
the fate of the principle as follows:
In the constitutional struggles of
the seventeenth century the books and
arguments of Bracton and Fortescue
were in the hands and on the lips of
Sir Edward Coke and John Selden
and all those who defended the old
ideas of constitutional liberty against
the new notion of divine right. But
when after the Revolution of 1688,
the divine right of Kings gave way to
the divine right of Parliament, it was
common lawyers again like Chief Jus-
Lice Holt and Sir William Blackstone
who ventured to doubt the new
orthodoxy.
4
It was common lawyers, too, on
this side of the ocean who did not
doubt the new orthodoxy merely,
but categorically challenged it on the
authority of Calvin's Case. To this
end tfey used Blackstone to good
effect and particularly the following:
When the Supreme Being formed
the universe and created matter out
of nothing, he impressed certain prin-
ciples upon that matter from which
it can never depart and without which
it would cease to be. . . . Man con-
sidered as a creature must necessarily
be subject to the laws of his Creator.
. .. It is necessary that he should in all
points conform to his Maker's will....
This will of his Maker is called the law
of Nature. . . . This.law of Nature
being coeval with mankind and dic-
tated by God Himself, is superior in
obligation to any other; no human
laws are of any validity if contrary to
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this; and such of them as arc valid
derive all their force and all of their
authority from this origin. . ... Hence
it follows that the first and primary
end of human laws is to maintain
these absolute [God-given] rights of
individuals. 5
But in spite of all this Blackstone
admitted that "if the Parliament will
positively enact a thing to be done
which is unseasonable, I know of no
power in the ordinary forms of the
Constitution that is vested with the
authority to control it".6
The juridical issue of the Ameri-
can Revolution could not be more
compactly stated. In Bonham's Case,
Coke had said:
And it appears in our books, that in
many cases, the common law will con-
trol acts of Parliament, and sometimes
adjudge them utterly void; for when
an act of Parliament is against com-
mon right and reason, or repugnant,
or impossible to be performed, the
common law will control it and ad-
judge such an action to be void. 7
Early American Lawyers
Believed in Natural Law
This was in 1610. Coke died in 163').
In his exposition of the natural law-
common law relationship, Blackstone
appears to agree with his illustrious
predecessor in all things except the
" power" of Parliament effectively to
override both natural law and com-
mon law. Blackstone unquestiona-
bly agreed that Parliament had no
"right" to pass such a law. Something
of the utmost importance to English
law had obviously happened between
the commentaries of Coke and Black-
stone respectively. That occurrence
was the English Revolution of 1688.
Dean Pound says that "the Revolu-
tion of 1688 made a profound change
in the English Constitution. The
seventeenth century polity as set
forth in Coke's doctrine, was the one
,we accepted at our Revolution and
put into our constitutions. When
these instruments declare themselves
the 'supreme law of the land' they
use the language of Magna Charta
as interpreted by Coke, namely, that
statutes could be scrutinized to look
into the basis of their authority and
if in conflict with fundamental law
they must be disregarded. This doc-
trine was as much a matter of course
to the American lawyer of the early
Revolution as tire doctrine of the
absolute binding force of an act of
Parliament is to the English lawyer
of today. American lawyers were
taught to believe in a fundamental
law which, after the [American] Rev-
olution they found declared in writ-
ten constitutions. After 1688 there
'was no fundamental law superior to
Parliament."s
It is most unfortunate that the
romantic and psychological side-
lights of the American Revolution
have lured historians away from the
logical and legal aspects of that
epochal struggle. Taxes, parliamen-
tary representation and finally the
very independence of the United
States itself were all incidental to the
main and controlling legal issue,
namely, the enforcement and im-
plementation of a law "superior in
obligation to any other . . .coeval
with mankind and dictated by God
Himself." This controlling issue was
made crystal clear by the Declaration
of Independence but for some rea-
son modern historians seem reluctant
to take the great Declaration at its
word. There is a subtle but unmis-
takable effort to edit this document
out of our jurisprudential system and
to regard its categorical postulates
as eccentric extravagances transposed
on the spot from a variety of foreign
philosophical dreamers in order to
make a rallying cry for. a rather des-
perate American cause. The fact is
that the Declaration is the best pos-
sible condensation of the natural
law-common law doctrines as they
were developed and expounded in
England and America for hundreds
of years prior to the American Revo-
lution. By pushing and pursuing the
principle of parliamentary absolu-
tisn it was England and not Ameri-
ca who abandoned the ancient
traditions of English liberty. In 1776
the British Government was insisting
that "the law of the land" and "the
3. Calvin's Case, 7 Co. 12 (o), 77 Eng. Rep.
392 (1608).
4. An Anonymous King's Counsel, The Common
Low of England (1948).
5- 1 81. Comm. 21, 31, 108 (Lewis' ed. 1897).
6. Ibid. 79,
7. 8 Co. 118 (a) (1610).
8. Pound, supro note 2.
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immemorial rights of English sub-
jects" were exclusively and precisely
what the British Parliament from
time to time declared them to be.
This claim for parliamentary absolu-
tism was at variance with all the
great traditions of the natural law
and common law as recorded through
the centuries from Bracton to Black-
stone. By abandoning their ingrained
concepts of the natural law, the
colonists undoubtedly could have
made a comfortable settlement of
their tax and navigation difficulties
with England, but they chose the
alternatives so well and so logically
described in the Declaration of In-
dependence.
Founding Fathers Did Not Invent
New Theory of Law
The inference that the principles of
the Declaration were extravagant
improvisations is refuted by the testi-
mony of the times. Nearly half a cen-
tury after the Declaration was
adopted, one Timothy Pickering
wrote to John Adams calling atten-
tion to the commonplace character of
pronouncements contained in the
great document and manifesting sur-
prise at the acclaim and reverence
accorded to it. Adams replied on
August 6, 1822. He said:
As you justly observe, there is not an
idea in it but what had been hack-
neyed in Congress for two years before.
Indeed the essence of it is contained
in a pamphlet voted and printed by
the Town of Boston before the first
Congress met, composed by James
Otis.
Pickering made Adams' letter the
subject of a speech delivered on the
Fourth of July in the following year
(1823) and Jefferson in turn paid
his respects to Pickering in a letter
to Madison dated August 30, 1823.
After a preliminary correction of Mr.
Adams' recollection in certain par-
ticulars, Jefferson wrote:
S. . Pickering's observations and Mr.
Adams' in addition, that it [the Dec-
laration] contained no new ideas, that
it is a commonplace compilation, its
sentiments hackneyed in Congress for
two years before, and its essence con-
tained in Otis' pamphlet may all be
true. Of that I am not to be the judge.
Richard Henry Lee charged it as
copied from Locke's treatise on gov-
ernment. Otis' pamphlet I never saw,
and whether I had gathered my ideas
from reading or reflection I do not
know. I know only that I turned
to neither book nor pamphlet while
writing it. I did not consider it as any
part of my charge to invent new ideas
altogether, and to offer no sentiment
which had ever been expressed be-
fo re ..
... Timothy [Pickering] thinks...
that the Declaration, as being a libel
on the government of England, com-
posed in times of passion, should now
be buried in utter oblivion, to spare
the feeling of our English friends and
angloman fellow citizens. But it is
not to wound them that we wish to
keep it in mind: but to cherish the
principles of the instrument in the
bosoms of our own citizens. . . . In
opposition, however, to Mr. Pickering,
1 pray God that these principles may
be eternal .... [Italics supplied.] 9
Far from attempting to invent new
theories and express them in the Dec-
laration, it was Jefferson's purpose,
as he later wrote to Henry Lee, Jr.:
Not to find out new principles or
new arguments never before thought
of, not merely to say things which had
never been said before; but to place
before mankind the common sense of
the subject in terms so plain and firm
as to command their assent and to
justify ourselves in the independent
stand we were compelled to take.
Neither aiming at originality of prin-
ciple or sentiment nor yet copied from
any particular previous writing, it was
intended to be an expression of the
American mind. All its authority rests
upon the harmonizing sentiments of
the day.1 0
The authorship of the Declaration
was in Jefferson's own estimation the
first of the three highest achievements
of his remarkable life. He was chosen
for that high honor because of what
Adams called Jefferson's "felicity of
expression". To the best of his un-
usual ability he was expected to
mirror the prevailing American point
of view, and, as we have seen, in
Jefferson's own judgment he did just
that. In a very important sense it is
misleading to attribute the philoso-
phy of the Declaration to the writ-
ings of John Locke. The latter fre-
quently confuses a point that is
vital to the American legal system;
a point which all of the influen-
tial American Revolutionary writers
Clarence Manion has been Dean of the
University of Notre Dame's College of
Law since 1941. Prior to that he practiced
law in Indiana, and taught history, gov-
ernment and constitutional law at the
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the Association since 1935.
made with full clarity and force. For
instance, Locke says:
When any number of men have
consented to make one community or
government they are thereby pres-
ently incorporated and make one body
politic wherein the majority have the
right to conclude the rest.1x
Locke's Philosophy Inconsistent
with Declaration of Independence
Locke thus implies that once govern-
ment is installed by the consent of
the governed the rights of individuals
and minorities are completely and
absolutely subject to its directions.
This doctrine is inconsistent with
the natural law and natural rights
philosophy of the Declaration of
Independence. It is at variance with
the essays, pamphlets and correspond-
ence that circulated so freely in
American Revolutionary times and
thereafter. This theory was certainly
not that of Thomas Jefferson. For in-
stance on June 7, 1816, Jefferson
wrote to Francis Gilmner that:
Our legislators arc not sufficiently
apprised of the rightful limits of their
power; that their true office is to de-
clare and enforce only our natural
9. Jefferson, 15 Writings 462.
10. 10 id. at 343.
11. Locke, 2 Two Treatises of Government, §
95-101.
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rights and duties and to take none of
them from us. No man has a natural
right to commit aggression on the
equal rights of another and this is all
from which the laws ought to restrain
him .... When the laws have declared
and enforced all this, they have ful-
filled their functions and the idea is
quite unfounded that on entering into
society we give up any natural right.1
2
And again in his notes on Virginia
he declared:
An elective despotism is not the gov-
ernment we fought for, but one which
should not only be founded on free
principles, but in which the powers of
government should be so divided be-
tween the bodies of magistracy as that
no one could transcend their legal
limits -without being effectually
checked and restrained by others.15
John Adams said that: "Rulers are
no more than attorneys, agents, and
trustees for the people", and he
added that if these betray their trust
"the people have to revoke their
authority" and substitute other
agents, attorneys and trustees.'
4
The effective limitation of sover-
eignty and government by division,
judicial review and democratic forces,
was thus held to be a necessary corol-
lary to the doctrine of unalienable
natural rights. This was indeed, the
significant contribution that the
American Revolution made to the
doctrine of natural law. The views
expressed in so many different ways
by so many of the Founding Fathers
during that critical period had all
been expressed and explored by
others from time immemorial. It was
the Founding Fathers of the Ameri-
can Republic however, who first did
something about it. Their experience
with the voice of Coke and Black-
stone on the one side and the hands
of Parliament on the other, con-
vinced them that Tom Paine was
right when he urged that:
Society is produced by our wants
and governments by our wickedness;
[that] society in every state is a bless-
ing but government in its best state
is but a necessary evil; in its worst
state an intolerable one; [that] gov-
ernment like dress, is the badge of
lost innocence-a mode rendered nec-
essary by the inability of moral virtue
to govern the world.15
Revolutionary America believed
that such an evil institution as gov-
ernment would certainly get out of
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hand unless closely checked from
every side. Just as firmly as they be-
lieved in natural law and natural
rights, therefore, they believed in
practical as well as theoretical checks
upon the possibility of government
violation of those rights. It was
not enough, in the opinion of the
Founding Fathers, to belabor sov-
ereignty with sound philosophy.
Sovereignty had to be split and
checked and degraded to the point
where it was obviously a servant of
the people's God-given rights. The
constitutional system put together by
the Founding Fathers, was devised to
keep this governmental servant in its
place, and on the job, and its job
was "to secure these rights" of man.
There was little or no dissonance
in the many widely publicized Ameri-
can views on this point in the latter
half of the eighteenth century. While
there was some difference of opinion
about the timing of the Declaration
of Independence, there was no ex-
pressed dissent from the principles
which it so clearly and unmistakably
announced. We have Jefferson's own
word that the document was pre-
viously and privately approved by
John Adams and Benjamin Franklin.
When it was submitted to the entire
Congress it was furiously and
thoroughly debated. Large sections
of Jefferson's specifications against
the King were lifted out bodily and
two significant additions were added
upon motion from the floor. These
additions are very much in point. At
the opening of the second to the last
paragraph the Congress inserted the
phrase "appealing to the Supreme
Judge of the world for the rectitude
of our intentions" and in the last
sentence of the same paragraph the
Congress inserted the words "with a
firm reliance on the protection of
Divine Providence".
It is thus obvious that the impor-
tant document was carefully reviewed
line by line by each of the signers,
all of whom accepted "the laws of
nature and of nature's God" together
with the significant "self-evident"
truths in their entirety and without
the slightest question.
There were many who are certainly
in the category of Founding Fathers
who were not present in, or members
of the Continental Congress when
the Declaration was adopted or
signed. Washington was occupied
with the defense of New York City
but we know from innumerable
sources that he was enthusiastic
about the fact accomplished as well
as the philosophy pronounced in the
Declaration. Young Alexander Ham-
ilton was also in uniform, but as
an undergraduate of King's College,
later Columbia, he had already re-
plied to "Westchester Farmers' " crit-
icism of the legality of the Continen-
tal Congress:
Granting your supposition were
true, it would be a matter of no real
importance. When the first principles
of civil society are violated, and the
rights of a whole people are invaded,
the common forms of municipal law
are not to be regarded. Men may then
betake themselves to the law of nature;
and if they but conform their actions
to that standard, all cavils against
them betray either ignorance or dis-
honesty. There are some events in
society to which human laws cannot
extend, but when applied to them lose
all their force and efficacy. [Italics
supplied.]
Hamilton's refutation incidentally
reflects the religious and philosophi-
cal nature of American college edu-
cation in those days. The currency
of deeply religious and philosophical
approaches to political and legal
questions by the college trained
leaders of the Revolution, is ex-
plained by the fact that from their
very beginning all American colleges
in existence at the time of the Rev-
olution were closely related to the
churches, and every one of them
featured courses in theology and
moral philosophy.
First Virginia Constitution
Based on Natural Law
At the time the Declaration was
adopted two distinguished Americans
were at work in Virginia drafting
the first constitution of that state.
This constitution began with its fa-
mous declaration 0'f rights-from that
(Continued on page 529)
12. 15 op. cit. supra note 9 at 24.
13. 2 op. cit. supro note 9 at 224.
14. 3 Works 456, 457.
15. Common Sanse, page 1.
